Trials, technology will test aircraft carrier Ford

The aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford stands tall at Newport News Shipbuilding, its construction nearly complete and more sailors arriving every week.

But in other ways, things are far from settled. The first-in-class ship faces significant challenges before it becomes combat ready and can deploy from its future home of Naval Station Norfolk, experts say.

At a recent Senate hearing, the Defense Department's top weapons tester cited "significant risks" for the Ford when it comes to passing a key, pre-deployment hurdle known as the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E), an independent assessment of the ship and crew during combat scenarios meant to be as realistic as possible.

Critical new systems have reliability questions or lack enough data to form judgments about performance, according to J. Michael Gilmore, director of Operational Test and Evaluation in the Defense Department.

"The maturity of these systems is generally not at the level that would be desired at this stage of the program," he said in testimony submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee on Oct. 1.

The Navy is scheduled to accept delivery of the Ford in March 2016. The Navy then plans a series of important tests, including that IOT&E, which is part of a series of evaluations that are separate from sea trials.

At the same hearing, a 40-year veteran of the government's top watchdog agency said meeting the Navy's schedule is like hitting several home runs in the bottom of the ninth.

It is possible, but "it's a big lift," said Paul Francis, a managing director at the U.S. Government Accountability Office.

Questions of reliability aren't new. GAO and other groups have raised concerns about the ability to integrate all the new technology packed aboard Ford in a timely manner.

With commissioning set for March, Sen. John McCain, the Senate Armed Services chairman, said, a number of organizations are to blame for questions about the Ford program and the concerns that lie ahead.

Original sin

At the hearing where Gilmore and Francis testified, McCain called the Ford program "one of the most spectacular acquisition debacles in recent memory."

He placed blame on Defense Department weapons buyers and the Navy, but he did not leave out Congress. "We could have intervened more forcefully and demanded more of the Department of Defense," he said. "We did not."

McCain traced problems with the Ford program to 2002, when then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld decided to integrate a number of new, untested technologies on the Ford all at once. It was a switch from the previous plan, which would have incorporated new technology over three carriers, starting with the USS George H.W. Bush, then the Ford, then the future USS John F. Kennedy, now under construction at Newport News.

The decision to pack a host of new systems on a single ship "was the original sin that so damaged this program," McCain said.

Remaining questions

The concerns raised by Gilmore focus on systems that allow Ford to launch and recover aircraft, and to defend itself.

To catch aircraft landing on the flight deck, the Ford will employ an advanced arresting gear using water-based technology to bring jets to a smooth stop. However, this technology was redesigned earlier this year based on durability concerns, Gilmore said.

Testing began in July at the Navy's land-based site in Lakehurst, N.J. The program won't accumulate meaningful data until later this year, Gilmore said. However, the system is installed on Ford.

"If any major issues are discovered during upcoming testing, it will be difficult if not impossible to incorporate any changes" onto the Ford, he said.

He also expressed concerns with the ship's dual-band radar system, now undergoing land-based testing at Wallops Island. Dual-band radar consists of two radars: Volume Search Radar and Multi-Function Radar. Testing is in the early stages, and the Navy plans to extend testing on the Multi-Function system for another year.

Dual Band Radar will be integrated with the Ford's combat systems, Gilmore notes. It is a critical system for air traffic control and self-defense. Like the advanced arresting gear, it has been installed on the Ford. That means it will be difficult to correct any problems uncovered in upcoming tests, he said.

The electromagnetic catapults that will launch combat jets off the flight deck have been under scrutiny for years. Known as EMALS, which stands for Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, it is further along than the advanced arresting gear. However, some concerns are still surfacing, Gilmore said.

Last year, tests showed that EMALS launches will cause too much stress for warplanes fitted with external fuel tanks. Fixing it will involve a software change, the Navy has said.

Gilmore agreed that the problem was fixable, but said, "it is a concern that these types of problems are being discovered so close to the ship's delivery."

The Ford also has new weapons elevators that move ordnance to and from the flight deck. Gilmore said there isn't enough test data to draw conclusions, "but the early evidence from testing (on the Ford) raises concerns" because the elevator tests "have required substantial contractor support."

Taken together, questions about these four systems raise doubts in Gilmore's view about the ability of the Ford to deliver on one of its key promises: an increased sortie rate.

Ford-class carriers are expected to generate 160 sorties per day, assuming 12 hours of operation, or 270 sorties per day when running around the clock.

The questions of reliability "clearly have the potential to diminish" the promised sortie rate, he said.

Walrus? Hole in the water?

Sen. Tim Kaine, the Virginia Democrat who sits on the Senate Armed Services panel, didn't dispute Gilmore's observations. He agreed with other senators on the need for system-wide reform in how the Pentagon acquires weapons. But he said other first-in-class ships have experienced problems, so perhaps a little perspective is in order.

The Ticonderoga-class cruiser was initially labeled in a media report as "an obese one-billion-dollar walrus at the high seas," Kaine said. The Arleigh Burke-class destroyer was slammed as "the Navy's billion-dollar hole in the water, another example of the Navy driving itself to the poor house in a Cadillac," he said, reading from a news article.

Closer to home, the early stages of the Virginia-class submarine program experienced significant cost challenges. But in each case, those programs overcame initial hurdles. The Virginia-class submarines, for example, are seen as a major success story.

One problem with ships, he says, is that you can't build a full-scale model.

"I love the try it and buy it (philosophy)," Kaine said, "and for some weapons systems, that's really what you do. You prototype it, you try it and then you buy it. But for a ship of this size, the prototype is the actual, and that's why you often see a difference between first-in-class and subsequent."

Defending the Ford

Navy leaders have long acknowledged problems with the Ford that stemmed from how it was built — construction began before the design was finished — and from early problems with some of the key systems already mentioned.

Sean Stackley, the assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition, at one point calmly looked at the panel and said, "I am responsible," in response to a question about who should be held accountable.

However, Stackley and other Navy leaders defend Ford-class carriers as critical to the next generation of Navy warfare.

It will go to sea with fewer sailors and generate far more electricity that will allow it to accommodate exotic, energy-directed weapons of the future. After years of increased costs, the Ford program budget has been stable for several years. Lessons learned from Ford are being used on the Kennedy, which the Navy estimates will cost $11.5 billon, as opposed to $12.9 billion for Ford.

Navy leaders who testified at the hearing said all the challenges raised are being addressed. And McCain, for all his criticism, credited the Navy for turning the program in a new direction.

"Ultimately, all of us need to internalize the lessons of this program," he said. "I am encouraged that the Navy appears to be doing so in their efforts to stabilize the program and change their approach to contracting for" Kennedy.