Skip to content

Rules of Engagement, Still Missing

Nearly five months and 1,100 airstrikes into the American-led war against the Islamic State, Congress has barely begun to fulfill its constitutional war-making responsibilities. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tuesday belatedly opened debate on legislation that would authorize the use of force, but there’s no expectation that the work can be finished before the session ends on Thursday. That means it will be put off at least until January, when the new Congress convenes.

The delay also means that President Obama will continue to conduct the war in Iraq and Syria under an outdated 2001 authorization, without explicit approval by Congress and without the necessary limitations that the committee chairman, Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, and two other members, Tim Kaine, Democrat of Virginia, and Rand Paul, Republican of Kentucky, have urged.

Presidents often resist attempts by Congress to limit their powers. But after 13 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq that first targeted Al Qaeda and then evolved into conflicts in other states (like Yemen) against “associated” extremists, the United States cannot afford to get caught up in another endless, all-consuming conflict.

The Menendez bill tries to address such concerns in part by prohibiting the deployment of American ground troops in the fight against the Islamic State, also called ISIS or ISIL, except in specific circumstances, including collecting intelligence; enabling airstrikes; and carrying out operational planning or “other forms of advice and assistance to forces fighting ISIL in Iraq or Syria.” The reference to “other forms” refers in part to rescue operations in support of American troops who may be injured on the battlefield, a reasonable exception. Still, the language seems too open to broad interpretation and could be used by presidents to justify almost anything.

President Obama has insisted that he has no intention of deploying ground troops in combat against the Islamic State. His stated plan is to rely on indigenous forces for ground troops, backed by American air power. So he should have no problem accepting the ground troop limits in the legislation.

?

Nevertheless, Secretary of State John Kerry argued against the limits at Tuesday’s hearing, saying Mr. Obama’s pledge “doesn’t mean that we should pre-emptively bind the hands of the commander in chief or our commanders in the field in responding to scenarios and contingencies that are impossible to foresee.” He is, in effect, asking Americans to take Mr. Obama at his word, and the administration’s insistence on this point calls into question just what the pledge on no ground troops really means.

Even if one took Mr. Obama at his word, his successor in 2017 may have fewer reservations about another enormous American-led ground war. Already, there are too many red flags about the potential for mission creep to ignore. Mr. Obama declared an end to American involvement in Afghanistan, yet he has already increased the size and expanded the mission of the residual American force that will be there in 2015. His military chief, Gen. Martin Dempsey, has publicly raised the possibility of deploying a limited number of troops to accompany Iraqi soldiers on complex offensive operations to retake Mosul and other areas under the Islamic State’s control. And, privately, some officials talk about possibly deploying United States ground troops (along with Turkish) if a decision is made to establish a buffer zone along the Syrian border that could be a shelter for refugees and a training area for moderate rebels.

Mr. Menendez’s bill also includes a much-needed sunset provision that would have the authorization expire after three years, which Mr. Kerry said the administration could accept. The timing is designed to get through Mr. Obama’s administration and then give the next president a year to assess the war before wrestling with Congress and reauthorization. The problem is that Mr. Kerry has also asked Congress to include a renewal provision after the three years. He didn’t detail how the renewal might work. If it is automatic, it could defeat the point of a sunset provision in the first place, namely that presidents should be required to go back to Congress to explain why a military conflict deserves continued support.

Mr. Kerry also urged the committee not to specifically bar the administration from taking the fight to other countries besides Iraq and Syria on the grounds that such a provision would alert the Islamic State that it could seek safe havens elsewhere. But if the conflict metastasizes, Mr. Obama should have to return to Congress and make the case for greater authority.

As much as Congress has tried to avoid the war authorization issue, so has Mr. Obama. Although he has insisted that he has all the authority he needs under the 2001 authorization, or A.U.M.F., against Al Qaeda and the 2002 authorization for the Iraq war, he recently said he would welcome congressional authorization against the Islamic State and Mr. Kerry repeated that on Tuesday. But the administration has dragged its feet in proposing its own version, working with Congress on a joint version or sending officials to participate in essential congressional hearings.

With time running out for this Congress, the best outcome this week would be for a committee that is still under Democratic control to approve a use-of-force authorization that imposes some limits on Mr. Obama. That would at least set a benchmark for when the Republicans take over in January. There are signs that some Republicans want a broad war authorization that could be exploited to justify military action against terrorist groups geographically beyond Iraq and Syria.

Going forward, any action on the use-of-force authorization must be accompanied by a thorough debate about American policy toward the Islamic State, including plans for Syria and for an overall exit strategy from the conflict. Sadly, at Tuesday’s hearing, too much time was wasted on arguing over whether Mr. Obama or Congress was the obstacle to drafting a use-of-force resolution.

###